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I. 
Culture, as the predominant form of symbolic 
production in Europe, entered the final stage of mass 
cultural production in the 1950s. Unlike traditional, 
bourgeois-affirmative culture produced by a socio-
structurally defined elite for precisely the same elite, 
mass-consumer culture is a form of culture geared 
to a country’s entire population, regardless of class. 
Today, in an era of globalized media and markets, 
mass-consumer culture is reaching out to all people 
in capitalist industrialized nations. This culture is 
no longer driven by class, as it was in the past. 
Rather, it is driven by the overall system of capitalist 
commodity production, something the protagonists 
of the historical avant-gardes could not have objec-
tively realized. 
Moreover, mass culture is not only a media 
phenomenon, but is created by the overall produc-
tion and market system of capitalist societies. That 
said, mass consumption is also imbued with a truly 
radical egalitarianism that the post-bourgeois soci-
eties of the West have taken on from preceding 
bourgeois societies as a form of political, social, and 
cultural self-interpretation and self-legitimacy. Mass 
culture is thus industrially produced, commercially 
disseminated, and consumptively appropriated as 
a differentiated and yet homogeneous universe 
of commodities that is egalitarian precisely in its 
consumption. It would very much seem that the 
contradiction accompanying modernity since its 
inception - namely, the antagonism of culture and 
modernization that possibly provided the most 
important prompt for the avant-gardes, persuad-
ing them to generate an urban mass culture as a 
culture of synchronicity - has finally been resolved 
in today’s mass culture.
Culture and Modernization  
Compared with earlier reforms intrinsic to the 
system, carried out in the second half of the nine-
teenth century in an effort to blunt the ever-sharper 
contradiction between culture and modernization, 
we can consider the programmatic demands by 
groups of artists made during and after the war, 
whose cultural thrust was in part revolutionary 
(and whom we shall treat collectively as the ‘avant-
garde’), to have been an opposition that exploded 
the system. 
It is well known that the avant-gardes initially 
described the contradictions as a chasm between 
art and life, which they sought to bridge. This diag-
nosis refers both to the fact that artistic production 
was distant from life and to the circular-ownership 
elitism of cultural life itself. The latter excluded the 
larger public owing to its lack of special aesthetic 
qualifications, and this exclusion in turn strength-
ened elitism as a social form and reinforced it, 
above all, as an aesthetic self-awareness and a 
special way of life. 
Members of the early modernist avant-garde 
movements were cultural revolutionaries, not 
only because this was their thrust, but, above all, 
because they came up against the firm propo-
8Undoubtedly, none of the avant-garde move-
ments could have seriously sought to bring about 
the oft-cited ‘transfer’ of art into traditional bourgeois 
life. There were, after all, reasons for the evolving 
contradictions between art and life; reasons to be 
found in the structure of bourgeois society in the 
first epoch of industrialization. The programme of 
linking the two spheres assumes not only a change 
in culture but also a change in society. Several 
paths could lead to it and I shall examine the three I 
believe are most important. 
The first path is the inclusion of everyday life in 
art. This angle, in particular, led to the destruction of 
the concept of the artwork and made it reasonable 
to expect social change in the sense of aestheti-
cization. This is a programmatic approach and, at 
least in terms of the destructive components, the 
path taken by Dada, Futurism and The New Objec-
tivity. 
The second path entails addressing artistic output 
and its links to a subject capable of change in a polit-
ical way. This subject can be a social class, ideally 
thought capable of action (i.e. the proletariat), for 
which the left wing of Dada, for example, had opted. 
Or a socially revolutionary party, such as the one 
the Futurists and also prominent Rationalist archi-
tects in Italy were affiliated with. Or it could be the 
type of political/administrative figures with whom, 
for example, the Bauhaus around Walter Gropius or 
‘Das Neue Frankfurt’ around Ernst May had cooper-
ated.
The third path involves integrating the arts into 
the social process of reproduction. It is the route 
taken by architects, designers, graphic designers, 
and photographers in particular, although here, too, 
different options are available. 
II. 
From the viewpoint of design, we can generalize 
the position of the politically focused avant-garde 
nents of a traditional understanding of art and 
culture, an understanding that in Germany was 
also strongly tainted by nationalism, namely the 
so-called educated middle class, a stratum that 
with its ostentatious cultural flair enjoyed strong 
support in practically all developed European 
countries. Each and every cultural innovation that 
sought to promulgate disenchantment and cultural 
sobriety, to align culture with the living conditions 
of industrial modernity, had to be pushed through 
in the face of opposition from these advocates of a 
traditional culture. Obviously, these attempts always 
constituted a shock to society as a whole. And the 
strongest shock was doubtlessly experienced by 
the social stratum whose status and position in 
society were defined by the fact that it controlled 
society’s most important cultural resources, which is 
why Bourdieu speaks of cultural capital. In case of 
doubt, they were the ones who stood to lose most.
Cultural change does not simply spell the intro-
duction of new forms, e.g. in the case of the 
avant-gardes it involved abstract painting, collage 
as a technique, new literary methods, Dada 
happenings, or the use of glass, steel, and inno-
vations in apartment construction and apartment 
typologies, but even change in the sense of replac-
ing the dominant proponents of culture. Precisely 
during its late phase in Europe (when its social base 
had noticeably eroded), the classically educated 
middle class continued to lay claim counterfactually 
not only to its humanist educational thrust but also 
to the status of a self-transparent subject - as if the 
critique of a philosophy of the individual, as formu-
lated by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, had simply not 
occurred.
Art and Life 
Overcoming the divide between art and life beyond 
the diagnostics aspect of art production always has 
a programmatic significance, namely to expand the 
audience and gain, through the artistic material, the 
aesthetic standards used in people’s everyday lives.
9tion of spheres of society as autonomous function 
systems.
The Fascist culture project, which shared the 
critique of the bourgeois culture’s elitism and solip-
sism with the avant-garde, substituted the idea of 
politicization with the real primacy of politics or, once 
power had been assumed, with the bureaucratic 
primacy of politics. Culture became fully integrated 
into state directives and was produced, distributed, 
and administered by state licence holders - which 
were part of the member lists of the Einzelkammer, 
which in turn was part of the Reichskulturkammer. It 
is well known that such a political culture model had 
a strong following in numerous European countries, 
but it was only fully put into practice in Italy and 
Germany, albeit in different ways. It was primarily in 
Germany where the mass-cultural transformations 
of bourgeois high culture took place. The Nazis, in 
particular, used the aesthetic centre of high-brow art 
in order to popularize it. Thereby, the aesthetic lost 
its critical function and its ability to bestow a certain 
particularity upon form. It becomes beautification. 
One can also say: mimesis becomes mimicry. The 
popularization of aesthetics is above all sustained 
through specially produced, immediate forms of 
technical mediatization. With this redefinition of 
what is aesthetic and its mediatization, the Nazis 
‘achieved’ a mass-cultural modernization that was 
adapted in the post-Fascist era and, under the new 
conditions, could undergo further seamless devel-
opment.
With the fall of its sovereigns, this power-depend-
ent, political model of culture was completely 
compromised. A political model of culture, i.e. the 
governance of the social process of culture under 
the auspices of the state had become unthinkable, 
at least in Europe. The model did not fail because 
of the contradictions that de-differentiations suppos-
edly represent in functionally differentiated societies. 
Rather, it failed like the totalitarian system, which 
due to the political primacy had bestowed legiti-
of the Weimar Republic and say that it increasingly 
saw its artistic work as labour aimed at chang-
ing social conditions. Thus, the virulent culture at 
the Bauhaus, given its internationalism, also bore 
clear traits of a trans-class and essentially market-
compliant culture. The roots of the aesthetic of the 
particular were severed in favour of transforming it 
into a medium for generalizing standards of living, 
utility, and residential life. Which is why the prod-
ucts of the Bauhaus, even in their most exclusive 
guise, still use the language of an industrially manu-
factured, typified, and standardized culture as mass 
culture.
In the period after World War I, there were two 
dominant approaches to the transformation of the 
aesthetic core of bourgeois high culture (i.e. the 
improvement and also the beautification of life),1 
with the Bauhaus standing for the former. It was 
the avant-garde project: programmatically envisag-
ing the politicization of art, and, vice-versa, imbuing 
everyday life with culture. The slogan that art and 
life be united, which stood for this mutual interac-
tion, thus pointed, on the one hand, to a concept 
of the aesthetic that instilled the project with a 
strong epistemological, and, in the case of some 
avant-gardes, an explicitly rationalist thrust. On the 
other hand, culture was no longer construed as a 
generative process for trammelling the developed 
individual, and therefore as something special, but 
rather as something that was aesthetically medi-
ated and in a non-institutional sense a political level 
of reflection on life. This was, as it were, a trans-
bourgeois attempt to realize the bourgeois promise 
of cultural equality, one that bourgeois society could 
never redeem for structural reasons. On the one 
hand, this project spawned an immense volume 
of art, which we now paradoxically call classical 
modernism. On the other hand, its programmatic 
agenda essentially had no impact. It was concep-
tually (not yet) possible to the extent that it sought 
to de-differentiate spheres of society - challenging 
the key achievement of modernity: the differentia-
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two economic currents during and after World War I. 
On the part of the artistic avant-gardes, the atten-
dant experience of barbarism linked to modernity 
decisively reinforced the radical awareness of a 
modernity that shed all historical references. It was 
an awareness that once again considered itself to 
be in the right. Openness became the paradigm for 
change and experiment, and the will to a permanent 
intensification in the aesthetic processing of the 
cultural side of life anticipated a form of modernity 
that did not factually exist yet in the 1920s.
It would very much seem as if the avant-garde 
in post-war Germany had initially lost sight of the 
previously politically grounded programmatic narra-
tives. Moreover, it seemed quite obsolete to insist 
on the destruction of the affirmative. After all, had it 
not been the Nazis who had pursued such destruc-
tion far more successfully than the avant-gardes 
before them, albeit with completely opposite goals 
in mind? For this reason, it seemed so compelling 
to regard the restoration of the avant-garde via the 
renewed recourse to the autonomy of art as an 
expression of an anti-fascist stance. The linkage of 
emancipation of individual subjectivity and radical 
social change called for by the avant-gardes now 
collapses once again. In the years that followed, 
the conservative cultural position repeatedly turned 
on attempts to closely link aesthetic innovation with 
social change. This taming of a recalcitrant art was 
followed in the early 1970s, after a brief intermezzo 
at the end of the 1960s, by talk of the failure of the 
avant-garde, before being subjected to outrageous 
defamation ten years later (particularly in architec-
ture). 
The question of whether today the universali-
zation of the aesthetic has indirectly realized the 
hopes of the avant-gardes of an aesthetics of and 
in lived practice, will be the subject of my remarks 
below.
macy upon the cultural model; in return, the cultural 
model gained its legitimacy through the effective-
ness of mass-cultural transformation. 
Constraints 
If I referred above to sociality and non-determina-
tion, then I meant the avant-gardes’ perspective 
with its fixation on technology, precisely defining 
the upheaval in the lifeworld of its day. Only if we 
construe it as a social process can the development 
of modernism be perceived as an open and flex-
ible environment that affords artists the opportunity 
to relate their activity to this development. Only an 
open process can be nurtured by human action and 
can consequently also be given a human measure 
and be brought down to a human level. 
From the viewpoint of today’s observer, the condi-
tions would, of course, appear to have been quite 
different. Let us not forget that the social process 
unfolding in the 1920s was that of a capitalist, indus-
trialized society, essentially Fordist in structure. As 
such, it was not fully determined, but definitely not 
open. It bridged two currents: one characterized by 
the oft-cited rationalism of capitalist modernization, 
and the other by its counterpart, irrationalism. And, 
contrary to what the avant-gardes’ euphoria over 
technology would have us believe, the market must 
have played a not insignificant role in terms of how 
it was perceived in the lifeworld. 
Put differently, the openness of the social process 
and the related ostensible non-determination of 
modernization were economically constrained in 
two ways, firstly by the investment decisions for 
capital goods, and, secondly, by the rules of market 
movements. 
For the avant-gardes, things appeared open and 
flexible by virtue of the fact that in the second half 
of the nineteenth century the consequences of a 
defined capitalist development, centred in conurba-
tions, coincided with the partial destruction of these 
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the war, they had already been in place in the USA a 
long time ago. At first glance, this approach roughly 
refers to a cultural system that is differentiated by 
sector. The historical agents of this differentiation 
were often - yet not exclusively - avant-gardist and 
rebellious groups, which today are marketed as 
subcultures. And these sectors are commercialized 
step by step from the outside to the inside, i.e. from 
the subcultural fringes to the centre of traditional 
high culture. I define commercialization here as 
a supply side of cultural commodities for a diver-
sified, yet potentially unlimited, market of solvent 
consumers. The economic system and the cultural 
system, reciprocally interpenetrated. In that sense, 
this process was more or less congruent with what 
today is called globalization. 
Just like the social model of culture, this model 
of culture was again an autonomous and self-steer-
ing model. However, here, self-control was not the 
consequence of an autonomous cultural socializa-
tion and of an aesthetic education, both of which 
would eventually culminate in the increasing perfec-
tion of a cultural type of habitus. It is the economic 
model of culture that exerts power over reality via 
the market. In this way, the cultural process loses 
its imperative vis-à-vis the political model as well 
as the forcibly asserted aestheticization of the 
force itself. But the process does not gain auton-
omy, or at any rate, only a limited autonomy, which 
nonetheless permits the subject to comfortably 
adapt. Because only in liberal theory, markets are 
autonomous negotiating entities. In practice, these 
markets increasingly oligopolize through a supply-
oriented policy, not least because of the strategic 
influence that conservative-liberal governments 
exerted in almost all Western countries during the 
last decades. And almost nowhere else do markets 
have a stronger supply side-oriented power posi-
tion than in the important sectors of the culture 
economy, where the dynamics of concentration of 
the large, globally active media and telecommuni-
cation groups have taken control of all branches of 
III.
Aestheticizations - as they have become mani-
fest in medial transformations of architecture and 
city space - are, in their universal expressions, 
the dominant tendency of contemporary cultural 
developments. And it should be pointed out that 
since the 1970s, the interplay of economy, culture, 
and aesthetics has not only greatly accelerated, 
but has also changed considerably in a qualitative 
sense. Previous delimitations were abandoned, 
resulting in a delirious extension of the aesthetic in 
almost all areas of everyday life. It is this obviously 
visible, aesthetically rather incomplete, discursively 
communicable fact that significantly sustains our 
impression that the city has changed vis-à-vis previ-
ous forms of urban life. And it did so in one decisive 
aspect: unlike the Fordist city, it is no longer merely 
an object which we animate with our subjectivities 
- albeit often against the city’s resistance. Instead, 
nowadays the urban embodies such a degree of 
substance that it appears to us as being the result 
of its own creation. Hence, we no longer experi-
ence the city as a human product, but as creation 
and creator in one. Compared to previous states 
of modernity, the urban is the medium of aestheti-
cization, in which today’s city fully represents the 
visibility of modernity. At the same time, in what is 
veiled, the city reserves infinite possibilities for the 
emergence of something that has been hitherto 
completely unknown - an aspect that we associate 
with hope, illusions, and a considerable measure of 
anxiety.2
 
The Economic Model of Culture
Ever since the reconstruction phase of capital-
ist industrial societies during the post-war era, we 
have experienced a third cultural model creation 
process, a process that is becoming increasingly 
visible. I have coined this ‘the economic model of 
culture’. This process began much earlier in the 
United States, where the quarrels about definitions 
have never or hardly ever taken place. While these 
conditions were only established in Germany after 
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cannot only refer to the distribution of goods and 
their consumption, even though these areas lead to 
comprehensive cultural transformations. Inside an 
increasingly artificial world, i.e. inside a fabricated 
and produced world, culture can no longer claim to 
remain in an autonomous zone for the production, 
transmission, and acquisition of aesthetic objects. 
Culture is integrated into the entire world system of 
production. Culture participates in the production 
of the world. This must mean, however, that the 
concept of production exceeds the conventional, 
purely economic sense of producing. This can mean 
that the limits of the economy in today’s society are 
no longer definable. In any case, one may conclude 
that production today entails more than fabrication 
according to purely economic imperatives.
In the economic model of culture - which during 
the 1960s began to replace older models of culture 
dating back to the Renaissance, without causing 
them to disappear entirely - the economy becomes 
a vehicle, and even an innovator and a producer of 
cultural developments. What I mean to imply here is 
that it does not only embrace the often-cited culture 
industry, but also the entire economy ranging from 
today’s dominant finance industry and the differenti-
ated sectors of the service industry to the extremely 
heterogeneous segments of commodity production. 
One can even say that, due to these developments 
and the cultural shifts, the culture industry loses or, at 
least, diminishes its formerly autonomous status as 
a discrete cultural and culture-economic segment. 
Instead, it penetrates at different points into zones 
of the general economy. This does not necessar-
ily entail an increasing economic functionalization, 
although it is a non-negligible factor. The overall 
production becomes more complex. Because of 
the ensuing institutionalized obligation to experi-
ment, one can expect growing ambivalences, which 
continue to characterize the economic production 
under the imperative to actualize, and which also, 
at the same time, exceed the conception of produc-
tion as I explained above.
material culture-production.
Let’s recall Frederic Jameson’s hypothesis about 
postmodernism being the cultural logic of late capi-
talism.3 It is not only in conceptual terms that he 
refers to Ernest Mandel’s theory of late capitalism.4 
Like Mandel, he argues that since the early 1960s, 
i.e. since the heyday of the Fordist-Keynesian 
regimes of accumulation, cultural production has 
penetrated the general production of goods. The 
constraint to differentiate the outer appearance of 
mass-produced products - Jameson speaks of ‘fresh 
waves of ever more novel-seeming goods’5 - which 
in principle are standardized, has led to aesthetic 
experiments and innovations. In those years, Fritz 
Haug coined the term ‘commodity aesthetics’ in 
describing the same process.6
 
This tendency became more radicalized during the 
1970s. It occurred through the emergence of new, 
flexible methods of production, especially based on 
newly developed computer-based process control 
technologies, which permitted limited-lot produc-
tion, and even the production of prototypes in a 
mass-scale industrial manner. This is an essential 
component of what we consider the aestheticiza-
tion of the everyday. But, of course, this is not all. 
If aestheticization would be limited to the surfaces 
of industrially produced commodities, it would stop 
half-way before reaching our everyday lives. It also 
has to affect the individual, his or her exterior and 
interior self, by way of the flexible generation of an 
image and through a continuous physiognomic and 
psychic refreshment. But there is more to it. Wolf-
gang Welsch pointed out that today’s processes of 
aestheticization are not merely surface phenom-
ena of the world of commodities or of human-body 
design, but that they penetrate into the deep struc-
tures of both matter and objects.7
Aestheticization is hence a universal and holistic 
phenomenon that has both a surface dimension and 
a deeper dimension. In this case, aestheticization 
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De-Differentiation
Yet this development of the culture industry is only 
one aspect of the economic model of culture. Inside 
this model, the economy functions simultaneously 
as a creator of meaning, a material-objective point 
of reference, and as vehicle and agent of cultural 
development. This results in the reciprocal, exclu-
sively internal programming of the intertwined 
elements of economy and culture, as well as the 
dynamization of its processes. In addition, the 
recursive design of programming and processes 
secures a high degree of adaptability to exterior 
conditions, e.g. to changes in social structure, 
fashion, and technologies to transformations of 
spaces and cities. Yet, even these ‘external’ condi-
tions are increasingly produced or co-produced 
by the economy/culture combination. Through the 
process of interactive learning, both perception and 
circumvention or assimilation lead to a reprogram-
ming of the relation of interdependence between 
economy and culture, whose active agents, in the 
broadest sense, are companies.9
Moreover, this means that the two core systems 
of modern societies are once again in the process 
of de-differentiation. They are no longer separate 
environments but they grow into ‘one single world’. 
Consequently, the century-old tendency towards an 
increased autonomization of these (and certainly 
also other) partial systems of society has been 
turned into its opposite in a short time-span of 
twenty to thirty years: instead of differentiation and 
autonomization we now see de-differentiation and 
interpenetration.
Somehow, one is able to sense the issue at stake. 
In one way or another, everybody is conscious of 
it. This issue is labelled as the commercialization 
of culture, and is often rejected by cultural critique 
- whether ‘progressive’ or conservative - as being 
detached from culture. Such a reaction, however, 
misjudges the direction in which the development 
is leading: it is not the economy that penetrates 
To begin with, there are two considerations that 
immediately become apparent. On the one hand, 
there are the mergers of companies from the fields 
of media, information technology and telecommu-
nications industries that took place during the first 
half of the 1990s. These mergers were politically 
supported and made possible through industrial-
ized countries’ politics of deregulation, especially 
in the last-mentioned sector. As is commonly 
known, this results in an enormous concentra-
tion of cultural distribution industries, which at the 
same time operate in entirely different sectors 
of the economy, especially in the infrastructural 
expansion of communication technology and its 
commercial utilization. On the other hand, we can 
discern a decreasing vertical range of manufac-
turing for the production of cultural commodities 
among these distribution industries. For the most 
part, this happens in their different branches: publi-
cation industry, film and television industry, as well 
as the music industry. Increasingly, these industries 
outsource to independent, predominantly small and 
mid-size production and service companies.8 The 
result is that the large companies’ real net gain is 
often limited to the product’s final assembly or its 
mediatized distribution.
To summarize: through its process of concen-
tration, the culture industry repeats the pattern of 
vertical disintegration of its productive structures 
that are typical of the entire economy. Even though 
the culture industry is increasingly integrating into 
other economic sectors and expanding into different 
areas of the general economy, that does not mean 
that its significance decreases. On the contrary, 
the enormously increased economic potential of 
this fully globalized industry shows its increased 
significance. It only goes through a process of 
transformation. By penetrating into the pores of the 
economic body, the culture industry’s importance is 
no longer restricted to a single (economic or cultural) 
sector, but becomes increasingly universalized.
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As a consequence, the exploitation of what exists for 
the cultural markets will not decrease but increase. 
This is because the cultivation of such potential with 
respect to market considerations is, first of all, too 
cost-intensive and, secondly, too long term, given 
the conditions of today’s dominant time-preference 
economy.
Let us state the following: the post-Fordist 
economy produces its own culture. As a whole, 
it becomes a cultural economy. At least four 
interwoven and culminating processes can be 
distinguished: first, the aforementioned integration 
of the traditional culture industry’s different sectors 
and their integration into overarching correlations; 
secondly, the economy’s structural mediatization 
has to be mentioned; the third process is that of the 
already referred to general aestheticization; and 
fourthly, social structural changes can be observed 
that lead back to economic restructuring processes. 
It is mostly in the high-income segment of the new 
service elite that the demand for culturally charged 
commodities and services is co-produced for its own 
supply. These demands for cultural consumption 
are highly differentiated, just as this professional 
category exhibits a high degree of differentiation 
with respect to their qualifications: among members 
of the middle classes, this phenomenon continues 
in the form of a differentiation of expectations.
But what are we dealing with, if not the synchro-
nization of these expectations with supplies? 
Bourgeois culture was concerned with other things, 
and we know how limited the success was. This 
means that the purely economic functionaliza-
tion of culture might be destined for a post-Fordist 
economy; but, by no means, does this economy 
signal the end of its empirical functioning. To return 
to Jameson’s initial statement, it may be well formu-
lated, but the cultural logic of late capitalism has 
quite a few cracks in its façade. 
into the realm of culture. On the contrary: it is the 
economy that is charged with culture.
Through the introduction of aesthetics into soci-
ety’s economic system of distribution, the society 
itself gains an air of luxurious opulence. Society itself 
is affected by the aesthetic surplus of its circulating 
commodities. Aesthetics, as a part of the circulat-
ing capital, has hence become an entity whose 
interaction with the world is entirely incorporated 
by means of the appropriation of this world through 
acts of gratifying consumption. That way, interac-
tion congeals into a non-cumulative experience. 
The need to interpret the cultural sphere, which 
has historically become autonomous, amalgamates 
with a brimming economy deficient in meaning into 
a state of reciprocal legitimation. This is achieved 
through the increasingly rapid incorporation of the 
cultural sphere into this very economy.
Commercialization
It is true that in the past, commercialization has 
been a mechanism of transformation for affirma-
tive culture. The same occurs on a mass scale in 
popular culture. The apparatuses of production 
want to be fed; the turnover has to meet expecta-
tions. There is no doubt that today, culture is subject 
to the same profit constraints as strawberry yoghurt. 
Yet, to define culture solely along those lines would 
only be half the truth. However, one can be clearer: 
after all, Fordist, standardized mass culture with 
its huge apparatuses does not simply disappear. 
Today and in the foreseeable future, it continues 
to satisfy too many desires; just like the transfor-
mation of the culture industry, despite its speed, 
could not be completed in one go. And possibly this 
process will never reach a state of completion. Even 
if this should happen, the capacities of production 
and distribution have not diminished, but, following 
capital’s principle of accumulation, have multiplied. 
What is clear is that the development of creative 
human potential for feeding the capacities has been 
lagging behind the expansion of these capacities. 
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phenomenon of difference. The culture of the 
block also holds a position of difference, which is 
further reinforced through the fact that it acquires 
an increasingly heterogeneous constitution through 
the processes prompted by its own economic foun-
dations and structures. 
So much for the first aspect of the commer-
cialization of culture, which is the often criticized 
de-differentiation of the economic and cultural 
system. It becomes obvious that we are dealing 
with a terminology that, in view of the conditions 
of the contemporaneous cultural transformations 
and its much broader correlations, requires a much 
more differentiated consideration. This impression 
is reinforced once one begins to discuss the quali-
ties of the transformed products.
Time-Space Compression
Let us discuss another aspect that advances the 
process of aestheticization, ‘time-space compres-
sion’, which David Harvey places at the centre of his 
analysis of present-day society and its culture.11 This 
aspect functions as a fundamental transformative 
mechanism of modern societies, often presented 
in the form of tables and charts. These space-time 
relations are symbolized through the inventions of 
new technologies of transportation and communica-
tion: ranging from sailboats, trains and aeroplanes 
to contemporary digital technologies with their real-
time transfers of information and data.12
The reasons for a qualitative acceleration, which 
began in the 1970s, can be found in the collapse of 
the Fordist model of mass production during a crisis 
of accumulation that was coupled with symptoms of 
persistent stagflation. The consequence of such a 
crisis inevitably resulted in a massive annihilation of 
capital, visible in the worldwide de-industrialization 
of formerly flourishing industrial regions and the 
desertification and impoverishment of cities. 
The fact that standardized culture production, 
especially its mechanisms of distribution, still projects 
like a massive block into what is new, only shows 
that, even in a differentiated demand structure, the 
homogeneous large-scale aggregates persist. It is 
also evident that the post-Fordist transformation 
of the economy (and of the culture industry) itself 
is neither a condition nor an economic or cultural 
era but an open process, which also implies a very 
concrete likelihood of collapse.
It is this fact that simultaneously opens up two 
empirical windows. On the one hand, the eminent 
block will still remain with us for a very long time. 
Even architecturally, it will continue to solidify and to 
decline qualitatively. The growing impoverishment 
inside society (rather than of society) inevitably 
entails a standardization of consumption and leisure 
habits at an ever-lower level, which is dependent 
on the re-financeability of individuals’ and families’ 
means of reproduction. On the other hand, one can 
conclude that culture today is produced in different 
temporal layers. Hence it exists as a non-contempo-
raneous functional complex. I am not referring here 
to historical sedimentations that we find in images 
of the city and museums but to present realizations. 
I am not directly thinking of differences in style, i.e. 
what postmodern historicism is directly concerned 
with. Neither am I referring to the endless wave of 
nostalgia, which is produced on very different tech-
nical levels and in almost all industries.
When we speak of historical striation in today’s 
culture, we mean something quite similar: the 
simultaneity - and in this simultaneity, the recipro-
cal relativization - of cultural products made by 
industries that are historically constituted in differ-
ent ways: hence, the simultaneity of a mass cultural 
block and post-Fordist segmentation. Moreover, we 
still have to add the handcrafted and manufactured 
production of the traditional arts.10 This means that 
post-Fordist culture, which is primarily differentiated 
through fashion, embodies a widely appreciated 
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the duration of an object’s actual use-value - despite 
the programmed decay and with its ever-decreas-
ing half-lives. What we discard in a ‘throw-away 
society’ is therefore not only the packaging turned 
utilitarian artwork, but also the still usable objects 
along with the symbolic systems, convictions, and 
lifestyles through which these objects were mean-
ingful for a brief period of time. Baudrillard points in 
the right direction when he claims that the Marxist 
analysis of commodities is obsolete because of 
contemporary capitalism’s primary occupation with 
the production of signs and sign systems and less 
with the production of commodity values.14 In fact, 
aside from the use- and exchange-value, a growing 
part of the sign-value is commodified in all goods 
and services. The aesthetics of light becomes an 
almost exemplary symbolization of this very imma-
terial ephemerality with which we consume the 
incessantly changing symbolic systems.
The other principal mechanism is the differentia-
tion of the product. Though, in order to be able to 
relate differentiated service identities and product 
identities to the pluralized or heterogeneous needs 
of consumer groups - which ensures differentiated 
consumption - it is necessary to also stabilize these 
differences symbolically. Product identities are often 
merely simulated in a symbolic way. Hence, this 
mechanism contributes to the symbolic change as 
overall evidence and, thereby, to the aestheticiza-
tion of the produced and serviced world.
However, these symbols cannot be simply 
attached to the objects like labels. Even though it 
happens on a large scale, it does not stand the test 
of the market. Consequently, the objects, objective 
symbolism, and lifestyles - which are synchronized 
in an accelerated, downright fluid process of repro-
duction - possess such a stability and capacity of 
interpretation. In the past, one might have called 
this authenticity. For this reason, a short test can 
be applied for identification and expulsion purposes 
that differentiates between what is fake and what is 
Space-time compression is an increasing accel-
eration of capital turnover. As we were already able 
to discern in the ‘block’ of industrial mass culture, 
some Fordist industries remain, for example its 
prototypes, the chemical and automobile industries. 
However, these have become restructured and 
adopted many of the instruments of flexibilization.
Considered from at least three points of view, 
these shifts and changes, illustrating the restructur-
ing of the economy on the basis of flexibilization, 
have a decisive cultural efficacy. First, the princi-
pal motivation for change actually shows its result: 
the densification of space-time. Its most colourful 
effects are achieved through the distribution and 
consumption of commodities and services. This 
complex of effects is habitually labelled aesthetici-
zation. Secondly, aestheticization is incorporated 
into services and products, present in its use and 
its materiality and through an increasing symbolic 
grounding not only of its non-material but especially 
of its material goods. Lash and Urry point out that a 
paradigmatic shift has been taking place in the post-
Fordist era, moving from a material foundation to a 
cultural foundation.13 Thirdly, the flexibilization of the 
economy entails a rather fundamental revolution of 
the social structure. And this structure determines 
all cultural practices, differentiations, forms of learn-
ing and idiosyncrasies, styles of behaviour or ways 
of representation, forms of exchange, and distinc-
tive symbolizations.
All these measures, intended to increase the 
mass production of commodities and services, rely 
on two basic mechanisms summarized in the idea 
of aestheticization. On the one hand, they receive 
an ever stronger symbolic charge. Its symbolic 
promise, which is integrated into value systems that 
need to be regenerated continuously, has to exceed 
the pure promise of a use-value. This is attributable 
to the fact that symbolic systems of signification can 
be altered faster through the concentrated deploy-
ment of modern media technologies than through 
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Indeed, we are dealing with a tendency that is 
becoming increasingly stronger. But by no means 
are we confronted with the final state imagined 
by the older proponents of critical theory. The 
economic model of culture is, like every past cultural 
model, a work in progress. The arts, i.e. the realm 
of traditional high culture, penetrate more and more 
into economic contexts of exploitation and merge 
with individual areas of mass culture. Its most 
advanced representatives, media and computer 
artists, become pioneers of industrial development, 
a fact that further underlines the significance of the 
process of symbolic construction. Nonetheless, it is 
the ‘high cultural’ field that time and again produces 
its own difference. While, overall, one might speak 
of a strong tendency towards a de-autonomization 
of art, it is also true that limits of this autonomy are 
constantly shifting, and not only backwards. In a 
field that is heterogeneous, complex, and contested 
by numerous interests, these limits are constructed, 
demolished, and reconstructed at different sites. 
The reason for this is that the conditions of auton-
omy, as well as its potential for posing a threat, 
have increased compared to the classical period of 
autonomous art. At the same time, the possibilities 
of causing an effect have become more ambiguous 
and more in need of interpretation.
Space-Images
Let us once again return to the question of the 
space-images and their corresponding models of 
culture. To begin with, there is the historic space-
image of the city defined as a centred, social, 
and architectural well-ordered entity that strongly 
defines its boundary and secludes itself within.
The classical industrial city, described by Simmel 
for its specific, traffic-related culture, offers the 
impression of a nervous agitation, which oscil-
lates spatially around its centre in a centrifugal 
and centripetal way. This fundamentally expan-
sive movement incessantly shifts the boundaries 
towards the outside. Through its predominantly 
‘true’ symbolism, which is typical of such a voting 
process or socio-cultural space.  
This cultural, reinterpreted ‘authenticity’ - which 
stands in the context of strongly heterogeneous, 
individual references, relatively rapidly changing 
self-constructions, and fluid identities - demon-
strated that the symbolic charges apply at a deeper 
level. They seem to have penetrated into the 
objects’ deep structures, into their matter. In fact, 
they are the true appearance of things, not merely 
its put-on appearance. This only works if they are 
produced with and ‘inside’ the objects, if they have a 
true and not only an ascribed value; in other words, 
if the semiotic process has become the basis not 
only of consumption but also of the production of 
consumer goods. And this is increasingly the case.
In summary, one can say that it is certainly a 
mistake to assume that the economic model of 
culture is a closed context of determination, exclu-
sively defined in economic terms. This would have 
further perfected, possibly through differentiation, 
the ideological context of deception, presupposed 
by Horkheimer and Adorno,15 resulting from a 
Fordist mass culture. Without a doubt, cultural 
production has increasingly become part of the 
economic process of reproduction ever since the 
Fordist phase. In addition, this development has 
accelerated during the past twenty years. The 
development can be attributed to the fact that the 
economy’s flexibilization and globalization led to an 
improved capacity to adapt to market conditions. 
This has been accomplished through its ability to 
determine these conditions on a long-term basis by 
inducing an abrasion of the symbolic in practically 
all commodity groups. Hence, one can assume that 
the produced ‘objective culture’ has reached an 
extent that is probably larger and more overwhelm-
ing than Georg Simmel assumed at the beginning of 
the previous century.16
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Critical Production of Space and Subjectivity
What is important here is what Georg Simmel under-
stands as the opposite of everything discussed 
above:18 ‘subjective culture’ - the social form of 
many individual subjectivities.19 It is certainly the 
case that the already mentioned supply parameters 
partake in forming individualities by structuring life-
worlds through assigning meaning to objects. But 
neither the lifeworlds nor the individuals become 
absorbed in economic reproduction. 
The opposite is the case. Through the macroeco-
nomic lowering of the wage rate and, particularly, 
of the income of the masses, the practices of the 
new regime of accumulation lead to a strong polar-
izing tendency of the social structures in all Western 
societies. This has abrogated the semblance of a 
middle-class levelling, which was a consequence 
of the Fordist mass culture of the 1960s. With its 
high-quality and luxury goods, the post-Fordist and 
increasingly differentiated mass culture targets first 
and foremost either the nouveau riche or those 
parts of the population still capable of maintaining 
a middle-class income. The growing remainder of 
the population is (still) supplied with low-quality 
and cheap goods of mass consumption. That way, 
through a highly scaled range of products and 
extremely diverse repertoires of symbolizations, an 
accumulation in different sectors of the economy is 
(still) possible - and this despite decreasing demand.
Concerning the consequences for the postmod-
ern city, this post-Fordist scenario of determination 
ignores - besides the social form of subjectivities 
- issues that have to undergo a more detailed anal-
ysis, namely: To what extent do local and regional 
cultures counteract, modify, or, in certain cases, 
accelerate this scenario? To what extent do such 
things influence the character of the discussed 
events? And to what extent do these events influ-
ence those decisions, also discussed above, as 
centrifugal mobility the Fordist city is character-
ized from the perspective of an increasingly blurred 
centre. Here, the boundaries do not simply shift but 
dissolve in the environs.  
The mode of movement of the post-Fordist or 
postmodern city is fluid - the industrial city no longer 
knows a stable condition. The boundary is no longer 
a spatial element of the city because the centre and 
periphery of its territory form a flowing sequence, 
both temporally and spatially, a sequence that can 
change its position. The classical urbanistic and 
urban-sociological idea of continuity, still tied to the 
material character of the built environment, loses 
both evidence and plausibility. 
The new mode of movement is re-examined 
through the fact that the traditional planning author-
ity of the industrial city has been transformed by the 
processes discussed above into a contingency of 
decisions and events. Urban development becomes 
more and more dependent on discussions concern-
ing the location of delocalized, supra-regional, and 
increasingly globalized businesses. Moreover, it 
depends on events that are produced through the 
fact that poverty and wealth are not only growing 
enormously inside the boundaries of cities, but also 
through the fact that they are no longer spatially 
segregated, in a traditional sense (West End/East 
End) and organized by specific cultures. Rather, 
these zones become entwined inside single inner-
city areas and become ethnicized through the global 
migration of the poor - an indirect consequence of 
the internationalization of the circulation of capital. 
It is a phenomenon no longer limited to the United 
States, which will increasingly become a reality in 
Europe as well. We are dealing here with potential 
constellations of a conflict with different possibilities 
of realization, as experiences in the United States 
have demonstrated, which are subject to a constant 
imperative of restructuring - either in the form of a 
consequence (of the events caused by the conflicts) 
or as a prohibition (in order to prevent the realiza-
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The immanent places in this abstract space of 
simultaneous events are, however, non-contem-
poraneous. The non-contemporaneousness of 
points of view, from a particular place, subjectively 
reduces the complexity of urban space through 
the classification of urban space into a particular 
order of individual preferences. That way, places 
are secured for individual habits and integrated into 
a ‘subcultural’ system of experiential knowledge. 
Abstract space consequently has a double struc-
ture: both through different lifeworlds and for each 
individual in different lifeworlds, which rarely corre-
spond to the entire city’s point of reference. Hence, 
the city has different boundaries for its inhabitants. 
For them, space has different extensions depend-
ing on the spatial order and organization of the 
places of their everyday lives. And this causes the 
perception of the city to always contain a temporal 
structure consisting of the conquest of space and 
the realization of place. 
The creation of place thus presumes the interac-
tive relations of each individual. Moreover, it opens 
individual possibilities of distantiation from distan-
tiations, as, for example, in a flâneur-like, urban 
‘universalism’.
In-Between and Over-and-Beyond 
One can characterize space as abstract only in 
relation to the complexity of events within the urban 
point of reference. In fact, the biographically consti-
tuted interconnection of places defines at least two 
clearly distinguishable qualities of urban space: 
an in-between and an over-and-beyond extending 
towards the horizon.
The system of place is historically and funda-
mentally determined for every individual through 
the functional spatialization of the social division 
of labour. But, in a post-Fordist economy, more 
and more people are permanently excluded from 
this division of labour. They have to make a living 
despite diminishing transfer payments. In addition, 
adaptive parameters?
In other words, one can assume that the decisive 
factors of urban developments remain operative, 
both politically and culturally - notwithstanding the 
seemingly inexorable growing social importance of 
the economy to which virtually everything, includ-
ing the land of the cities, has to be subordinated. 
Yet, as always, this is also a question concerning 
the institutions capable of carrying out such an 
operation. If one excludes them from the analysis, 
one submits oneself to the idea of the naturalness 
and, hence, the inevitability of dominant processes. 
Consequently, one accepts the great narratives 
about the inherent necessity of economic survival, 
a narrative that supposedly has rendered obsolete 
and destroyed the functional potential of all great 
past narratives that spoke of human happiness and 
the progressive humanization of the world.
To this end, I will make a few remarks about the 
processes of the subjective production of space in 
the sense of a creation of place.
Creation of Place 
From our inside perspective, the city generally 
appears as the utmost point of reference of all 
social relations. This applies to localized as well as 
inter- and supra-urban relations. The city becomes 
an abstract space of the concurrence of all events. 
It is therefore overly complex and, in spite of all 
the stereotypes about one’s own city, it essentially 
remains unfathomable to most of its inhabitants. As 
a consequence, many time zones inside the city 
become emotionally connoted in different degrees, 
which can lead to an alleged un-inhabitability, an 
assertion fabricated to a large extent by the media. 
In a modern society, the media, through their report-
ing, determine the hierarchy of topics treated. This 
impacts the emotional classification of urban zones 
or entire cities.
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movement vectors and time are linked. This move-
ment, which is not able to subjectively stabilize the 
in-between space, but which affects a constant 
transformation, contains the mediation of places 
and differences. By contrast, in the above-and-
beyond this difference is refuted. Here, movement 
has to be understood in a double sense: space 
moves inside a process of transformation, which, in 
turn, is caused by the movement of human beings 
in space. Once we leave this self-generated system 
of places and move inside the field of the above-
and-beyond, our ability to constitute place inevitably 
decreases and becomes almost nil: space expands 
into the unknown and into the total image of the city 
as a point of reference for all kinds of events.
Outlook
If local and regional traditions, in which the subjec-
tive constitution of space is inscribed, should play a 
role, they will only have the opportunity to burgeon, I 
believe, in the in-between space. This is also meant 
in the sense of a conscious processing of social 
and cultural experiences made therein. For this, we 
need urban public space: this is inevitable and a 
worthwhile pursuit.
Architecture will have to bear this in mind and 
should deal with this idea! However, the question 
that remains completely open is to what extent and 
in what way criticism has to be inscribed in architec-
tural praxis.
The strength of a (new) critical architecture, 
defined as the aesthetic objectification of localiza-
tion, would consist in actively inscribing itself into 
the in-between. Architecture should reflect the 
in-between and even become the place that is 
brought into a state of oscillation through the cultural 
dynamics and productivity of the in-between. This 
is true especially since the built object not merely 
symbolizes space, but also fills the space between 
the different places. An architecture could be called 
critical once it conceives of itself as a production 
the spatial effects of a flexible division of labour 
are experienced by the majority of those who still 
have employment in the form of pulsating displace-
ments. And finally, for the new middle classes of 
high-income producers of symbolic commodities, it 
becomes possible to freely choose places accord-
ing to lifestyle and milieu considerations. In our 
cities, all this leads to the beginning of a disintegra-
tion of a system of places that was established and 
evolved during the period of industrialization. Even 
inside the city, and partly even between cities, this 
system becomes flexible. Accordingly, the social 
housing policy and state-side support - which, as 
important elements of a particular socio-economic 
regime of regulation, are always in sync with the 
dominant social imaginary - act almost inevitably 
as agents of a neoliberal dissolution of places for 
the working or unemployed underclasses (radical 
cutbacks for construction of social housing). This 
is also true for the partial re-localization of particu-
lar middle-class groups, especially those with a 
life orientation revolving around a family (support 
for private housing). Its effects are known: land-
consuming suburbanization, negative energy 
balance and elevated, traffic-related emissions.  
One of the most interesting zones is the 
in-between. Although it is not as well secured as the 
traditional place, it is the mediating link between this 
and other places. Almost everything that happens, 
happens here. Place is the individual and social unit 
of reproduction, and its routine is the basis for its 
security. By contrast, everything that happens as 
mediation in the in-between zone takes the form of 
social and cultural production and is therefore, in a 
sense, also an individual creation of form. 
This is probably the reason why Michel de Certeau 
deals preferably with this type of space.20 For him, 
the in-between is not simply the negation of space. 
Upon close inspection, negation happens only in the 
over-and-beyond. Rather, de Certeau conceives of 
the in-between as a construction in motion, where 
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criticize in both architectural and urban discourse.
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